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THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE
DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY
If one accepts as a norm Cardozo's maxim that "[t]he final cause
of law is the welfare of society,"' economic theory may provide a useful
basis for evaluating the social consequences of legal doctrines. This
note will demonstrate the usefulness of applying an economic analysis
to the doctrine of impossibility of contract performance, the legal prin-
ciple applied to contract disputes which arise when an unforeseen catas-
trophe prevents performance of a contract whose terms do not allocate
the risk of that catastrophe. The traditional legal analysis, by limiting
its view to the allocation of losses which have already occurred and by
ignoring the problem of assigning the risk of future losses, has pro-
duced inconsistent and arbitrary risk assignments, to society's detri-
ment. The proposals of other legal writers would have the same effect.
This note will demonstrate through an economic analysis that the law
should allocate the risk of disruption unequivocally to the party better
able to insure against the risk, subject to reassignment by the parties
in their contract.
Economic Efficiency and the Legal Norm
To show that Cardozo's maxim is valid, one may begin with the
question: Why should the government enforce promises? Without
courts to enforce contracts and with no guarantee that a promisor will
keep his promise, only people with a reputation for keeping their prom-
ises may enjoy beforehand the value of their future performance. No
one would pay as much for a promise of performance as he would for
a performance already rendered if he knew he could not collect dam-
ages for nonperformance. On the other hand, when courts enforce
contracts, a party may enjoy the full present value of his future service
because enforcement secures promises end makes them valuable.
Governmental enforcement of promises makes everyone better off by
increasing the present value of future obligations. It would appear,
then, that contract enforcement is justifiable at least on the grounds that
it improves the lot of those persons it affects.
This apparent legal norm-that contract law should make people
generally better off-has an economic analogue in the concept of
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economic efficiency. Suppose that all the resources in society are re-
distributed. Economists describe the new distribution as more eco-
nomically efficient than the old one if it increases at least one person's
utility-the degree of satisfaction he derives from his possessions-_
without decreasing anyone else's.3 In a perfectly efficient distribution
no one's utility can be increased without decreasing someone else's.
Although utility extends beyond physical goods and money and
includes any scarce commodity, such as clean air, leisure time, or even
freedom, in commercial contexts it is convenient to equate utility with
wealth. Economic efficiency is the same concept as the legal norm of
contract law derived earlier, with two important limitations. First, util-
ity depends on each individual's perception of the satisfaction he de-
rives from his possessions. Economics does not indicate when another
is made better off: the concept of efficiency leaves that decision to each
individual. Second, the criterion of economic efficiency excludes from
consideration resource redistributions which make a person better off
at anyone else's expense. In such a case one must decide upon some
other basis that the new distribution is more just, fair, or equitable.
Though economic theories do not indicate that a distribution making
everyone better off at someone's expense is just, neither do they indi-
cate that such a redistribution is unjust. The subject is simply beyond
the scope of economic inquiry.4
The important conclusion to draw from the comparison of the con-
cept of efficiency with the legal norm for contract law earlier derived
is that a contract principle is justified whenever its operation produces
a more efficient distribution of resources. To say that a legal doctrine
is economically efficient is to say that that doctrine makes society better
off.
2. Alchian, The Meaning of Utility Measurement, AM. ECON. Rnv., Mar. 1953,
at 26-50.
3. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 47-49 (3d ed. 1972). An-
other term for economic efficiency is Pareto optimality. H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS
199 (1968). If, in a refugee camp, B has one cigarette and one candy bar, and if A
has nineteen of each, the distribution is probably fairly efficient since there are few ex-
changes of cigarettes and candy bars which would make B happier without making A
less satisfied. If A has twenty candy bars and B has twenty cigarettes, the distribution
is probably inefficient because each would probably feel happier after several exchanges
of cigarettes for candy bars. Economics indicates in objective terms that the first dis-
tribution is more efficient than the second, but whether one says that the second is fairer
because the wealth is divided roughly in half depends on one's subjective notion of jus-
tice.
4. M. FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN PosrrrvE
ECONoMICS 3 (1953). In proposing that courts consider economic criteria in reaching
decisions, the author recognizes that in certain cases the court will determine that equita-
ble considerations prevail over what it perceives as the remote economic values resulting
from a clear judicial assignment of the risk. Analysis of the relation of economic effi-
ciency to justice must be reserved for consideration at a later time.
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The Traditional Legal Approach to the Impossibility Cases
The impossibility cases are those which arise when an unforeseen
event makes performance of a contractual obligation by one party ex-
tremely burdensome.5 The legal tool traditionally applied to these
cases is known as the doctrine of impossibility." Suppose A, who owns
developed land, rents a building on the land to B. The contract does
not indicate who bears the risk of a catastrophe, and the building col-
lapses in an earthquake. Who should bear the loss? If a court dis-
charges B from performing his contractual obligation because of the
catastrophe, the court deprives A of his rent. If the court holds B to
his bargain, the judgment forces him to pay for something he never
received. This example reveals the paradox.
The early English courts held that catastrophes which prevented
contract performance did not excuse the promisor from liability for fail-
ing to perform.7  In Paradine v. Jane8 a lessee tried to excuse his fail-
ure to pay rent on the ground that the invasion of the country by a
foreign enemy had prevented him from using the leased premises. The
court apparently held the defense insufficient because the ancient prin-
ciple of pacta observanda sunt-agreements are to be observed-
stood in the way of discharging the promisor. The court stated that
if the lessee had wanted to make his promise of rent conditional, "he
might have provided against [the risk of disruption] by his contract."
Though dictum denying any defense of impossibility probably did not
accurately reflect English law even then,"° the case has often been cited
5. See 6 A. CoRmN, CONTRACTS § 1320 (rev. ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
COmIN].
6. See id.
7. It is important to keep in mind the difference between excusing liability for
failing to perform and excusing performance. Some writers seem to confuse the two,
treating the doctrine of impossibility as the only means to avoid compelling the promisor
to do something dangerous, futile, or illegal: 'The outcome of these cases is in practice
dictated by a shifting line of compromise between the impulse to uphold the sanctity
of business agreements and the desire to avoid imposing obligations that are vain or un-
duly burdensome." Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts.
1-2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373, 379 (1936-1937) (emphasis added); see, e.g., 41 Tur.. L.
R!v. 709 (1967). Obviously, if the court denies a promisor's plea of impossibility, the
court is not therefore going to compel him to endanger himself or to do something use-
less or illegal. Such a denial simply imposes on the promisor the loss to the promisee's
expectation interest (see text accompanying notes 61-62 infra) caused by the promisor's
inability to perform. In Takahashi v. Pepper Tank & Contracting Co., 58 Wyo. 330,
131 P.2d 339 (1942), the court refused a decree of specific performance where the per-
formance sought had become illegal but indicated that damages in such a situation might
still be appropriate.
8. 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
9. Id.
10. Brewster v. Kitchell, 91 Eng. Rep. 177 (K.B. 1697) (liability excused when
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as an example of the attitude of the English law that contract obliga-
tions are absolute.'1
The landmark case of Taylor v. Caldwell'2 provided the exception
to the Paradine rule of absolute liability for nonperformance of con-
tracts. The defendant rented a music hall to the plaintiff; then,
through the fault of neither party, fire destroyed the hall. Because the
parties must have known that they could not perform their contract ob-
ligation without the hall, Judge Blackburn held that the fire excused
the parties' liabilities on the basis of an "implied condition" in the con-
tract that the parties would be bound only if the hall remained stand-
ing."3 This expedient absolved the judges from making a new contract
for the parties, a responsibility which the common law judiciary was
reluctant to undertake. Blackburn in effect said that discharging the
promisor would, indeed, give effect to the parties' contract because the
parties had intended their performance to be conditional although they
had not put the condition in the writing. This reasoning gave the ap-
pearance of faithfulness to the old rule while shifting the losses
according to a term which the contract, in fact, did not include. By
skirting the barrier of pacta observanda sunt with his implied condition,
Blackburn provided many courts with the rationale they would use to
justify the doctrine of impossibility.14
Although legal writers, perhaps inspired by Holmes, 15 criticized
the fiction of an implied condition,' they still tried to justify the doc-
trine of impossibility as effectuating the intentions of the parties. Wood-
ward proposed allowing the defense only for catastrophes which the
performance became illegal); Williams v. Lloyd, 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1639) (liability
excused on destruction of a specific subject matter); Hyde v. Dean of Windsor, 78 Eng.
Rep. 798 (K.B. 1597) (liability excused on death of promisor).
11. E.g., Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U.S. 12, 22 (1917); Jacobs, Marcus & Co.
v. Cr&lit Lyonnais, 12 Q.B.D. 589, 603 (1884).
12. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
13. Id. at 314.
14. E.g., Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921); La Cumbre
Golf & Country Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co., 205 Cal. 422, 271 P. 476 (1928).
15. "You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condi-
tion in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because . . . of some attitude of
yours upon a matter not capable . . . of founding exact logical conclusions." Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HAiv. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
181 (1920).
16. "Mhe analogy of the implied condition is evidently a fiction which is at best
unnecessary and at worst misleading." Note, The Development of the Doctrine of Im-
possibility of Performance, 18 MICH. L. REv. 589, 598-99 (1920).
'This 'implied condition' would seem but a poor fiction at best to justify a conclu-
sion reached upon some undisclosed ground." 27 CALIF. L. REv. 460, 461 (1939).
See CORBIN, supra note 5, § 1322, at 331; 6 S. WiLLIsTON & G. THoMsON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1937 (rev. ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as
WILLISTON].
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parties "would probably have regarded . . . as so obviously terminat-
ing the obligation as not to require expression . ... 1 Williston con-
sidered the importance factor to be "whether an unanticipated cir-
cumstance has made performance . . . vitally different from what
should reasonably have been within the contemplation of both parties
when they entered into the contract.""' While these formulations
avoided using an implied condition, they did not provide useful criteria
for decisions in cases of first impression or explain the judicial process
which produced consistent discrepancies among the cases.
An example of such a discrepancy is the anomaly of the building
contract cases. If a contractor agrees to build a structure and a catas-
trophe, such as a fire, occurs on the last day of construction, the
doctrine of impossibility does not apply, and the building contractor
breaches his contract. 9 If he agrees to repair a structure and a fire
occurs on the last day, the doctrine of impossibility does apply, excusing
both parties.20  The only way to reconcile this difference between the
contract-to-build cases and the contract-to-repair cases using the Wood-
ward and Williston formulations is to say that when the fire prevented
the repair of the building, the parties probably regarded the fire as so
obviously terminating the obligation as not to require expression be-
cause the fire made performance vitally different from what they
originally contemplated. When the fire prevented construction of the
building, however, the parties must have regarded the possibility of fire
in an exactly opposite manner. Clearly, though, the contemplation of
the parties would not differ so drastically between the two situations.2"
Perhaps a better explanation of the doctrine of impossibilty is that
it serves not as a legal theory, but as a rhetorical device to justify a
particular distribution of losses when the courts have no language in
the contract to guide them.22 Corbin, commenting on Taylor v. Cald-
17. Woodward, Impossibility of Performance, as an Excuse for Breach of Con-
tract, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 533 (1901) (emphasis omitted).
18. WmLiSroN, supra note 16, § 1931, at 5411. The Restatement follows Willis-
ton's formulation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNcRA'rs § 281 (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1974) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
19. E.g., W.A. Chapman & Co. v. Montgomery Water Power Co., 126 F. 372 (5th
Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 605 (1904); School Dist. No. 1 v. Dauchy, 25 Conn.
530 (1857); Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448 (1874); Thompkins v. Dudley, 25 N.Y.
272 (1862); see Clark v. Collier, 100 Cal. 236, 34 P. 677 (1893).
20. E.g., Young v. City of Chicopee, 186 Mass. 518, 72 N.E. 63 (1904); Haynes
v. Second Baptist Church, 88 Mo. 285 (1885).
21. There is a crucial difference between saying, in the contract-to-repair cases,
that the parties did not intend for the builder to finish the repair on a destroyed build-
ing and that they did not intend for the builder's expectation interest to be protected.
The latter does not follow inevitably from the former. The two possible intentibns are
mutually independent.
22. See generally Bohlen, Old Phrases and New Facts, 83 U. PA. L. RaV. 305, 310
(1935).
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well, made the same observation: "But the court knew how the risks
of loss in case of such a fire ought to be allocated; and it found an
'implied condition' as a means to serve its end . *."..- It would appear
that the courts have determined what results should be achieved in the
contract-to-repair cases on some other, unspoken ground and use the
language of the doctrine of impossibility to justify that result. Thus
the judges apparently see no logical inconsistency in applying the doc-
trine of impossibility in the contract-to-repair cases but ignoring it in
the contract-to-build cases, even though the circumstances in the two
sets of cases differ only in the respect that a building is to be con-
structed on the one hand and repaired on the other.
Operation of the Doctrine of Impossibility
Despite its name, the doctrine of impossibility does not require ab-
solute impossibility before liability will be discharged. Nevertheless,
the principle does not apply when the added cost of performance due
to a supervening event is not extreme.24  The doctrine is inapplicable
when the impossibility is subjective, rather than objective,25 or when
the defendant knew of the potential disruption or should have foreseen
it.26  When a contract allocates the risk of the event to one party or
the other, the courts naturally reject the defense.
Through the doctrine a party may excuse his performance in three
situations. In the first he says, "A catastrophe prevented my perform-
ance; therefore I should be excused." In the second he says, "A catas-
trophe prevented his performance; since I won't get what I bargained
23. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 1322, at 331.
24. E.g., Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U.S. 12 (1917); Mineral Park Land Co. v.
Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916), criticized in Comment, Contracts: Excuse
of Performance by Existence of Condition Causing Unforeseen Expense, 4 CALIF. L.
REv. 407 (1916); see CoRBiN, supra note 5, § 1325, at 338; WILLISTON, supra note 16,
§ 1931, at 5410-11; RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 281, comment d. See generally Pat-
terson, Temporary Impossibility of Performance of Contract, 47 VA. L. REv. 798
(1961).
25. The difference between objective and subjective impossibility is the difference
between "it cannot be done" and "I cannot do it." E.g., El Rio Oils (Canada) Ltd.
v. Pacific Coast Asphalt Co., 95 Cal. App. 2d 186, 213 P.2d 1 (1949); see COBIN,
supra note 5, § 1325, at 337 (unfortunately using trip to moon as example of objective
impossibility); WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 1932; RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 281,
comment e.
26. E.g., Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1966); cf. Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944); see CoRBIN, supra note
5, § 1329; WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 1959; RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 281, com-
ment d; 41 MARQ. L. REv. 314 (1957-1958).
27. E.g., Day v. United States, 245 U.S. 159 (1917); Depot Constr. Corp. v. State,
19 N.Y.2d 109, 224 N.E.2d 866 (1967); see CoRBIN, supra note 5, § 1328; WmLISTON,
supra note 16, § 1972A; RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 281, comment c.
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for, my performance should be excused." In the third he says, "A
change in conditions makes his performance worthless to me; therefore
my performance should be excused. ' 28  The courts have applied the
doctrine in three types of cases. The first case is supervening legal
impossibility, which occurs when a change in the law makes perform-
ance either illegal or extremely difficult.2 9 The second is impossibility
due to the death or illness of an essential person. 0 The third is impos-
sibility due either to the lack of availability of a specific thing necessary
for performance 31 or to the lack of a certain arrangement of circum-
stances necessary for performance.32 A decision in an impossibility
case has two effects: it allocates the losses between the two parties be-
fore the court, and, through the effect of stare decisis, it assigns the
28. CoRBN, supra note 5, § 1320, at 323. American writers refer to the third
excuse as frustration of purpose. Comment, Contracts-Frustration of Purpose, 59
McH. L. Rnv. 98 (1960). But see Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doc-
trine, 3 DE PAUL L. Rnv. 1 (1953). English writers apply the term to all three situa-
tions. For the purposes of this note the distinction between impossibility and frustra-
tion of purpose is not important.
Often included as an excuse is the situation in which the impossibility existed at
the time the parties made the contract although they were unaware of it. Courts analyze
this situation either in terms of the doctrine of mutual mistake of a material fact or of
the doctrine of impossibility. Compare Petry v. John F. Buckner & Sons, 280 S.W.2d
641, 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), with Faria v. Southwick, 81 Idaho 68, 72, 337 P.2d
376 (1959); see WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 1933; Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12, 31-35
(1962). The Restatement treats the problem of "existing" impossibility in a separate
section. PSrATEmENT, supra note 18, § 286.
29. A change in domestic law may prevent performance. E.g., Omnia Commer-
cial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923); Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219
U.S. 467 (1911); Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 94 Wash. 125, 162
P. 31 (1916); see CoRBIN, supra note 5, § 1343; WILISTON, supra note 16, § 1938. Ju-
dicial, executive, and administrative orders may prevent performance. E.g., Texas Co.
v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921); see WILLSTON, supra note 16, § 1939.
Furthermore, the doctrine has been held to apply when foreign law prevents perform-
ance. E.g., Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., supra; see CoRBIN, supra note 5, § 1351.
But in other cases the doctrine has been held not to apply when foreign law prevents
performance. E.g., Tweedie Trading Co. v. James P. McDonald Co., 114 F. 985 (S.D.
N.Y. 1902); see WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 1938. Even if not expressly overruled,
these latter cases are no longer authoritative. Mention is made of them to put the reader
on notice of their existence. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 284.
30. E.g., Cutler v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 274 Mass. 341, 174 N.E. 507
(1931); Buccini v. Patero Constr. Co., 253 N.Y. 256, 170 N.E. 910 (1930); see WI-
LISTON, supra note 16, §§ 1940-43; RFSTATEmENT, supra note 18, § 282.
31. E.g., La Cumbre Golf & Country Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co., 205 Cal.
422, 271 P. 476 (1928); International Paper Co. v. Rockefeller, 161 App. Div. 180, 146
N.Y.S. 371 (1914); Howell v. Coupland, 1 Q.B.D. 258 (C.A. 1876); Taylor v. Caldwell,
122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863); see WILLISTON, supra note 16, § 1948; RESTATEMmNT,
supra note 18, § 283.
32. E.g., Allanwilde Transp. Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U.S. 377 (1919);
Squillante v. California Lands, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 2d 89, 42 P.2d 81 (1935); see Wn.-
LISTON, supra note 16, §§ 1951-53; RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 283.
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risk of future loss to future parties in similar circumstances.
When an American court excuses a promisor from liability for
nonperformance, it will generally use a formula for restitution,33 often
based on a theory of unjust enrichment.3 4 If a party has partially per-
formed and if the court excuses liability for failing to perform further,
the party receives a judgment for the value of the benefit his part
performance conferred on the promisee.3 5 If a party has fully
performed and if the court excuses the other party from further per-
formance, the performing party receives judgment for the value of the
benefit conferred on the other.3 6 While each performing party may
recover the value of the benefit conferred during his performance of
the contract, the judgment may not exceed a ratable portion of the
contract priceyt
To deal with the impossibility cases the courts have created a rhe-
torical device to invoke when, because of some other consideration,
they desire to relieve the promisor of liability for not performing his
contract. Though that consideration is not articulated, the result of the
doctrine is a process of loss reallocation which is extremely complicated
and which results in increased uncertainty of outcome in individual
cases.
Alternatives Suggested by Other Legal Writers
In fashioning alternatives to the doctrine of impossibility, legal
writers have concentrated on the loss allocating effect of the doctrine
to the exclusion of the risk allocating effect by attempting to construct
fair allocation schemes based on analyses of losses which have already
occurred. As will be seen, analyzing any allocation method simply by
the way it distributes losses does not yield useful information for decid-
ing which method is preferable. Rather, it will prove more useful to
examine how different allocation schemes affect the assignment of the
risk of loss in future cases. We will see the difficulty in formulating
a sound allocation method based on a loss analysis by examining the
allocation alternatives others have proposed.
33. See CoRnmN, supra note 5, § 1367-72; WiLLISTON, supra note 16, § 1977; RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 18, § 292.
34. CoRnrN, supra note 5, § 1372.
35. E.g., Ontario Deciduous Fruit-Growers' Ass'n v. Cutting Fruit-Packing Co.,
134 Cal. 21, 66 P. 28 (1901); Buccini v. Paterno Constr. Co., 253 N.Y. 256, 170 N.E.
910 (1930); Stratford, Inc. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 94 Wash. 125, 162 P. 31
(1916).
36. E.g., Krause v. Board of Trustees, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 264 (1904); Von
Waldheim v. Englewood Heights Estates, Inc., 115 N.J.L. 220, 179 A. 19 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1935).
37. RESTATEMENT (FiRST) OF CONTRACTS § 468 (1932).
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The first recommendation 8 for reform suggests that when an
"impossibility" case comes up, the court should relieve the promisor
of liability for not performing and then divide the losses to the parties'
contract interests39 equally. For example, suppose A hires B to build
an elevator in his apartment building and agrees in exchange to furnish
B with an apartment. After B has spent $1,000 installing the device
and A has spent $200 readying the apartment, a fire destroys the whole
building. According to the fifty-fifty approach, each would be liable
to the other party for one-half of the other's losses incurred in perform-
ing the contract: A would owe B $500 (half of B's $1,000), and B
would owe A $100 (half of A's $200), with the result that B could
obtain a judgment for $400.40 The leading advocate of this approach
proposes a statutory scheme for a fifty-fifty division of the losses,4 ' justi-
fy his proposal with these reasons:
Because the occasion for discharge is ordinarily an externally
caused, unknown, or unanticipated event, neither party will have
assumed the risk in the vast majority of cases and neither party
will be a "wrongdoer" to whom the court can easily assign responsi-
bility for loss. Thus, only innocent parties will bear losses resulting
from a contract discharged as burdensome, and therefore equitable
consideration further suggests that at least some . . . losses . . .
should be evenly shared.42
This passage is noteworthy in two respects. First, the author justi-
fies his approach simply with the assertion that "equitable considera-
tions" suggest it without providing more specific analysis which would
enable one to evaluate the proposal more readily. Second, the author
limits his analysis to the distributions of loss resulting from different
allocation schemes without considering the resulting distributions of
risk in future cases.4 3
38. The reform has been articulated by several writers. Sharp, Promissory Liabil-
ity, 7 U. Cm. L. REV. 250, 269 (1940); Comment, Quasi-Contract-Impossibility of
Performance-Restitution of Money Paid or Benefits Conferred Where Further Perform-
ance Has Been Excused, 46 Micr. L. Rav. 401, 421 (1948); Comment, Loss Splitting
in Contract Litigation, 18 U. Cm. L. Rav. 153 (1950).
39. See text accompanying note 61 infra.
40. Comment, Loss Splitting in Contract Litigation, 18 U. Cm. L. Rav. 153, 160
(1950).
41. Comment, Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A
Statutory Solution, 69 YALE LJ. 1054 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Solution].
This comment is widely cited with approval. See Birmingham, A Second Look at the
Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light
of Economic Theory, 20 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1393, 1398 n.18 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Birmingham]; Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967
Wis. L. REv. 833, 837 n.4; Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and
Frustrating Things-The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RrrrGERs L. Rv.
419, 445 n.126 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schlegel].
42. Statutory Solution, supra note 41, at 1058-59 (emphasis added).
43. That legal writers have reached these conclusions by examining loss alloca.
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The second reform advocated simply allows the trial judge the dis-
cretion to evaluate and apportion the losses in any manner he deems
just.44 The English Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act45 so pro-
vides. This loss allocation scheme also precludes any consideration of
how future risks should be assigned.
Another commentator, Schlegel, advocates a third reform:46
I would like to suggest that, where an unusual event occurs and
[impossibility] is alleged, contracts should be enforced only when the
the contract in question is essentially similar to the archetypical
contract situation: the contract between brokers, each essentially
speculating on a narrowly fluctuating market.... [E]ssential re-
liance damages ... as well as the cost of any partial performance,
should be split between the parties. Thus, an event should be held
[as rendering performance impossible] when it is not one within that
narrow range of events normally incidental to the average bro-
ker's or wholesaler's contract-slight delay and small market fluc-
tuations. Further, as the size of the loss increases, the courts
should be more willing to shift part of it . . .47
The notable feature of Schlegel's approach is that, besides adopting the
preceding two reforms, he suggests a vastly increased liberality in the
discharge of contracts.
Birmingham, a commentator who attempted to apply an economic
analysis to the impossibility cases which arose when the Suez Canal was
closed,48 has offered a fourth alternative.4" He argues that in the case
of a contract for the sale of goods, if the catastrophic event which pre-
vents the seller from shipping the goods also causes the price of the
goods in the buyer's port to rise, then the added cost due to the event
should be imposed on the buyer, who presumably will not be harmed
since he can resell at the higher market price.50 For example, if a sel-
tions is most dramatically evident where an author rejects altogether the concept of risk
allocation: "But the idea [of risk allocation] is not strictly accurate. Normally we
think of risk in terms of an unknown. It is out of line with this usage to say that a
court can 'assign' or 'allocate' the risk of an event which has occured [sic] and of which
all the parties are aware. It is a certainty rather than a risk with which we are con-
cerned." Comment, Quasi-Contract-Impossibility of Performance-Restitution of
Money Paid or Benefits Conferred Where Further Performance Has Been Excused, 46
MICH. L. REv. 401, 406 n.13 (1948). Although the court cannot assign the risk in the
case then before it of an event which has already occurred, through the operation of
stare decisis the decision of the court may have the effect of allocating the risk in future
cases with similar facts.
44. Statutory Solution, supra note 41, at 1086.
45. 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c.40 (1943).
46. Schlegel, supra note 41.
47. Id. at 447-48 (citation omitted). The author here is speaking of "frustration"
as English writers use the term. See note 28 supra. American courts in this context
would probably use the term "impossibility."
48. See notes 81-84 & accompanying text infra.
49. Birmingham, supra note 41.
50. Id. at 1412-1[6,
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ler of goods grown or manufactured south of a canal makes a contract
with a buyer north of the canal, and if the canal later closes, then the
liability of the seller for not delivering the goods would depend at least
in part on the effect of the closing on the market price of the goods
in the buyer's town. If the market price went up by an amount equal
to the added cost due to more expensive transportation around the
canal, then the court, Birmingham suggests, should discharge the seller
and force the buyer to pay the additional shipping costs by going into
the market to buy substitutes. The market price of the goods in the
buyer's port would presumably reflect the additional costs of trans-
portation. 51
All these suggestions have certain shortcomings. Ordering the
trial judge to apportion the losses 'according to the equities of each par-
ticular case begs the question of what is a wise way to divide the losses
and leaves the answer to the judge's subjective and unspoken notions
of justice. The reforms incorporating loss shifting (the fifty-fifty
approach) or the liberal discharge of contracts (Schlegel's approach)
fail to state why it is just to allocate losses in these manners, and their
authority would seem to be no greater than that of any other bald asser-
tion that a particular result is fair or just.
Birmingham's proposal52 has two practical drawbacks. First, it
too fails to indicate why it is unfair to hold the seller to his bargain
when the disrupting event causes windfall profits to the buyer. Second,
it only applies when the event creating the impossibility also affects the
market price of the goods to be delivered: a fire which burns down
one house, for example, usually does not affect the price of houses gen-
erally.
Birmingham's proposal, which he purportedly based on an eco-
nomic analysis, is subject to further objection on theoretical grounds.
The author concludes that "a deeper probing of the economic conse-
quences of the unexpected occurrence forming the basis of claims of
[impossibility] will frequently lead to revised calculations concerning
the amount of resulting gain or loss . . . ." This much may be true,
but he errs when he suggests that some economic theory or concept
will "offer new guidelines for . . . distribution [of the resulting gain or
loss]."'54 No economic theory indicates that any distribution of wealth
is more just than any other.55 Since the author bases his arguments
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1415. The author here is speaking of "frustration" as English writers
use the term. See note 28 supra. American courts in this context would probably use
the term "impossibility."
54. Id.
55. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
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on an economic analysis, if he wishes to show that economic criteria
will offer new guidelines, he must show some logical connection be-
tween the economic consequences of a particular disruption and his ob-
jective criterion, which, in economics, is efficiency. However, as a
leading commentator has shown, efficiency is achieved whichever way
the law allocates the risk of loss.,"
Any analysis based solely on scrutiny of loss allocations after the
losses have occurred must produce arbitrary results. Any scheme of
loss allocation in impossibility cases will make one party richer and the
other party poorer, each by the same amount. The observation was
made earlier that governmental intervention in the affairs of private
parties to a contract is justifiable when that intervention improves the
lot of those it affects. 7 This justification is absent in a contract doc-
trine which improves the lot of one individual at the expense of the
other. One must look beyond an analysis of losses to find useful infor-
mation with which to evaluate any loss allocation scheme.
An Economic Analysis: Allocation of Risks Rather Than Losses
Examining the doctrine of impossibility in terms of economic effi-
ciency indicates again that any comparison of loss allocation schemes
will yield no useful information regarding the efficacy of the alterna-
tives if the analysis is limited to past losses. Efficiency means making
people better off without making anyone worse off in the process.58
The concept of efficiency has no relevance to any scheme of allocating
past losses because any change beyond leaving the losses where they
lie makes one party richer at the other's expense. The peculiar nature
of this notion of efficiency means that to the economist losses which
have already occurred are "sunk" costs,59 and it is of no interest to him
who ultimately bears them. The economist is more interested in how
the law assigns the risks of future loss. 60
Before shifting attention away from the loss allocating effects of
56. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See text ac-
companying note 74 infra.
57. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
58. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
59. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Pos-
Nan]. The author notes: "Not only are justice and fairness not economic concepts, but
the economist is not interested in the one question that concerns the victim and his law-
yer: who should bear the costs of this accident? To the economist, the accident is a
closed chapter. The costs that it inflicted are 'sunk' costs that cannot be retrieved by
a transfer payment from the injurer to the victim . . . . The economist is interested
in methods of preventing future accidents and thus reducing costs . . . . The decision
in the case will affect the future, and so should interest the economist, because it will




different allocation schemes to their risk allocating effects, one must
define the interests a contract creates in order to see how the various
allocation schemes affect those interests. Suppose A hires B to build
an apartment building on A's land, A to pay B two progress payments,
one on signing and the other on completion. Further suppose that A
can rent his land unimproved for P, dollars per year and that with the
improvement he can rent it for P2 dollars per year. They agree that
B will build the apartment for C dollars; B anticipates that construc-
tion will cost him C2 dollars, the present value of C2 being smaller
than the present value of C1. A enters the bargain because he antic-
ipates a gain from the increased present value of future rents of the
improved property over the present value of such rents of the
unimproved property, P2-Pi, discounted over time. B enters the
agreement because he expects a gain in the difference between the
contract price and his costs, C-C 2. Legal writers call these sums
the parties' expectation and reliance interests:"' A's expectation inter-
est is his expected net revenue from renting improved land, or P 2-
Pi, discounted over time. B's expectation interest is his anticipated net
revenue from performing the contract, C1-C 2. A's reliance interest,
the amount he invests in furthering his own contract performance,
is the contract price, C_. 62 B's reliance interest is his cost of construction,
C.,. Should a breach of the construction contract occur, a court's
choice of whether or not to apply the doctrine of impossibility or any
other allocation scheme would affect the parties' contract interests.
We can contrast these effects by comparing a situation in which
the doctrine is not applied with one in which it is. Suppose that a fire
completely destroys A's apartment building the day before promised
completion. A sues B for breach of contract, and B defends on the
ground of impossibility and counterclaims for the final progress pay-
ment, C,/2, on the ground that if the court denies his plea of impossi-
bility, it should rule that he substantially performed. The court's
choice of how to allocate the losses to A's and B's contract is limited
to three options. First, it can hold that the doctrine of impossibility
does not apply when a fire prevents a builder, such as B, from finishing
the building on time; this allocation has the effect of assigning the risk
of future fires to future builders and of securing owners from the risk
of fire. Second, the court can hold that B substantially performed and
that the doctrine of impossibility does not excuse an owner, such as A,
61. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46
YALE L.I. 52, 373 (1936-1937); Statutory Solution, supra note 41, at 1054-55.
62. Some writers refer to the amount a party invests in expectation of contract
performance which does not further his own contract performance as the "incidental"
reliance interest. If A spent P3 dollars to advertise the improvements to his land, this
would be his incidental reliance interest. Statutory Solution, supra note 41, at 1055.
March 1975] 1263
from paying the contract price for his destroyed building; this allocation
secures builders from the risk of fire and assigns that risk to future
owners. Third, the court can hold that the doctrine of impossibility
does apply and excuse performance on each side, allowing restitution by
some formula." Giving a party risk security, thus securing him from
a particular risk, is like giving him a scarce resource at the expense of
the other party. When a court assigns the losses to builders, for in-
stance, it assigns a valuable property in the form of risk security to
owners.
Of the three different allocations, the American courts have cho-
sen the first one with respect to catastrophes which prevent construc-
tion: a builder breaches his contract if a fire prevents him from finish-
ing a structure on time.6 4 The courts refuse to apply the doctrine of
impossibility to excuse the builder but give owners security from the
risk of fire until completion. Assuming the amounts are sufficiently
definite and foreseeable,65 A would be allowed to recover from B his
lost anticipated net revenue (P 2-P, discounted over time), as well
as the cost of rebuilding."" Since P2-P, discounted over time, re-
presents A's expectation interest, securing A from the loss protects his
expectation interest.6 7  In this case the court's refusal to allow the de-
fense of impossibility protects the owner's expectation interest and
gives to future owners the valuable property of risk security while im-
posing on future builders the cost of that risk.
What happens when the doctrine of impossibility is applied? The
consequences can be seen by examining the contract-to-repair cases.
If, in the example, B had promised to repair A's apartment rather than
to construct a new one, American courts would rule that when fire pre-
vented B from performing, his performance was excused. 8 A's per-
formance likewise would be excused, since the performance he had
bargained for would not be forthcoming.69 In effect, the courts have
chosen the third allocation scheme mentioned above. The question of
the recovery allowable remains a complicated problem.
Recall that when the doctrine of impossibility is applied, each
party may recover from the other the value of the benefit his part per-
formance conferred on the other.70 In the hypothetical case posed
63. See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
64. See cases cited note 19 supra.
65. See, e.g., Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680, 688, 160 P.2d 832, 838 (1945)
(breach of warranty).
66. See, e.g., Henderson v. Oakes-Waterman, Builders, 44 Cal. App. 2d 615, 617,
112 P.2d 662, 664-65 (1941).
67. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
68. See cases cited note 20 supra.
69. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
70. See text accompanying notes 33-37 supra.
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above, the value to B of A's part performance would always equal
the amount of the first progress payment, C1/2. The value to A of B's
part performance would depend on how much of the improvement
B had completed before the fire occurred. If B had virtually finished
the repair, the value to A of B's part performance would be the price
of the repair, C,. If the fire occurred before B began adding the build-
ing materials to A's structure, a court would hold that B's part per-
formance did not benefit A because B added nothing to A's land.7' If
the fire occurred when the repair was virtually complete, the value to
A of B's performance would be the contract price, C1, less the first
installment, C,/2, which represents the value to B of A's performance.
B's recovery, C,/2, plus the first installment equals the contract price,
which is exactly what B would have recovered had the courts refused
to apply the doctrine of impossibility and merely assigned to builders
security from the risk of loss to their expectation interests under the
second allocation. Under either rationale for deciding the cases, the
judgment would protect B's expectation interest.
On the other hand, if the fire had occurred before B began add-
ing building materials to A's structure, A would have received nothing
of value from B, but B would have received the first progress payment,
C1/2, from A. Thus, A would have a judgment for this amount. If
the courts, in the contract-to-repair cases, had assigned to future owners
security from the risk of loss to the builders' expectation interests, A
would have had the same judgment. Under either rationale for decid-
ing cases, when the fire occurs before the repair is begun, B's expecta-
tion interest would not be protected.
A comparison of the effect of applying the doctrine of impossi-
71. E.g., Young v. City of Chicopee, 186 Mass. 518, 72 N.E. 63 (1904). The
concept of restitution just for work and materials incorporated in the building has not
been favored by courts and writers. Corbin and Williston have to go to some length
to justify it. See CoRniN, supra note 5, § 1372; WmLsToN, supra note 16, §§ 1976-
77. An interesting series of cases presented the issue to the Massachusetts court after
a general building contract had been declared void. Several subcontractors had made ex-
tensive preparations, but few materials had been assembled or incorporated in a building.
In M. Ahem Co. v. John Bowen Co., 334 Mass. 36, 133 N.E.2d 484 (1956), the court
allowed a subcontractor to recover the value of labor and materials apparently assem-
bled under the plumbing subcontract. In Boston Plate & Window Glass Co. v. John
Bowen Co., 335 Mass. 697, 141 N.E.2d 715 (1957), the plaintiff, realizing that he had
installed no windows (and thus that the defendant had not been "benefited"), brought
an action for breach of contract, but the court denied recovery. In Albre Marble & Tile
Co. v. John Bowen Co., 338 Mass. 394, 155 N.E.2d 437 (1959), the plaintiff faced a
similar situation but brought an action for the value of the preparatory work. The court
allowed recovery, even though the real estate had not been "benefited," on the ground
that while the defendant's conduct was not a breach of contract, it was sufficiently
blameworthy to allow the plaintiff to recover preparation expenses not benefiting the
defendant. The court distinguished the earlier cases on the ground that in Albre the
contract terms specified the preparatory work necessary for performance.
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bility, illustrated in the contract-to-repair examples, with the effect of
not applying the doctrine, shown in the contract-to-build illustrations,
shows that when the court does not apply the doctrine, the parties' con-
tract interests are well defined: risk security is clearly associated with
owners' contract interest in every case, and the owners' expectation in-
terests are always protected. When the court applies the doctrine of
impossibility, as in the contract-to-repair examples, the parties' contract
interests are vaguely defined. On the one extreme, when the repair
is complete, the builders' expectation interests are protected; on the
other extreme, when the repair is just begun, the builders' expectation
interests are not protected. The only distinguishing factor is the stage
of completion the repair has reached when the fire occurs.
Since the rate at which materials will be incorporated into a build-
ing depends on eventualities the parties cannot foresee, the degree to
which the parties are exposed to the risk of the fire is uncertain. In
the face of this uncertainty the parties may well insure against a portion
of the risk twice by duplicating insurance coverage. The total cost for
insuring for both parties will be greater than if the whole risk is borne,
and insured, by one party. This uncertainty could be completely elim-
inated by associating risk security in the contract-to-repair cases con-
sistently with either party's interests, instead of applying the doctrine
of impossibility. If this were done, the restitution schemes made nec-
essary by the doctrine, along with their concomitant ambiguities, could
be avoided.
No economic theory holds that weak definition of contract inter-
ests, such as occurs when the doctrine of impossibility is applied, is in
itself undesirable. The limit of economic inquiry is whether weak defi-
nition of such interests produces economic inefficiency.12
A distribution of goods is economically efficient when it is not
possible to improve any individual's utility except at someone else's ex-
pense.73 Ronald H. Coase, in an important article, showed that when
the law assigns rights and duties, it does not matter from the point of
view of economic efficiency to whom the law initially assigns them. 4
As long as the law assigns the risk squarely to someone, the combined
wealth of the parties will be maximized. Although Coase illustrates
his theorem with an analysis of rights in real property and the risk of
72. See note 4 supra.
73. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
74. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase derives
this result using the case of tort liability for damage caused by wandering livestock. He
shows that as between a rancher who raises livestock and a farmer who raises corn, no
matter which one bears the risk of damage to the farmer's corn due to the rancher's
wandering livestock, corn and cows will each be produced at an efficient rate. Id. at
2-8.
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a particular nuisance, his conclusions would appear to apply as well
to contract interests and risks of disruptions.
Let us apply Coase's theorem to the building contract situation hy-
pothesized earlier. Suppose that for some time the government has
been insuring builders and owners against the risk of fire. Given the
elimination of this risk, the responses of builders and owners to the eco-
nomic environment can be depicted with supply and demand curves,
as shown in the figure below. The horizontal axis denotes numbers
of houses built, the vertical axis denotes the selling prices of one house.
The curve D1 depicts the number of houses which consumers would
purchase at any given price; St depicts the number of houses the con-
struction industry would offer to build at any given price. As the price
goes up, fewer consumers would be willing to purchase houses, satisfy-
ing their desire for shelter from some other source; at the same time,
builders would be willing to supply more houses, transferring building
resources from less profitable projects to home building. The market
will eventually arrive at equilibrium at the intersection of S, and D,
(point X), with price per house equal to P, and the number of houses
purchased equal to Qi.
Should the government stop absorbing the cost of the risk of fires
and impose the expected cost of that risk (the product of the proba-
bility of fire and the dollar amount of loss if there is a fire)75 on the
parties, from the standpoint of efficiency it would not matter which
party bore the risk.
Assuming an expected added cost of two units, if the law assigns
this cost to home builders, in the long run the supply curve will shift
two units upward to S2. This shift reflects the fact that in effect the
risk of fire taxes the home builder two units from the purchase price.
The market will eventually arrive at a new equilibrium at point Y, the
intersection of D, with S2, with price equal to P2 and number of houses
purchased equal to 02. On the other hand, if the law assigns the
added cost to home buyers, in the long run the demand curve will shift
downward two units to D2, reflecting the added cost to consumers of
the new risk. The market will eventually arrive at a new equilibrium
at point Z, the intersection of S, and D2, with price per house equal
to P3 and rate of production again equal to Q2. The difference be-
tween the Q2 and Q, quantities of houses is a consequence of the
government's fire insurance subsidy.
Regardless of whether the builder or the buyer bears the risk of
loss from the fire, the number of houses bought and sold remains the
same, Q2. But when the law assigns the risk to home buyers, the mar-
ket price is two units lower than it would be if the builders assumed
75. Cf. H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYsis 9 (1968).
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the burden. Nonetheless, such an assignment is not necessarily prefer-
able because buyers at the lower price purchase a risk-laden house and
must absorb the loss if a fire occurs. If a buyer wishes a risk-free
house, he must purchase insurance, which will cost at least as much
as the expected cost of the risk of fire. When this cost is added to
the cost of the house, the total price is at least as high as it would be
if the builder were assigned the risk, P2. Thus, no matter which way
the law assigns the risk of fire, the price and quantity of houses offered
risk-free to the buyer will be the same.
Risk security is as much an economic good as anything else bought
and sold. If an individual's conduct involves a one in one thousand
chance of a $50,000 loss, the conduct has a $50 expected cost (equal
to .001 X $50,000). Nevertheless, he may be willing to pay as much
as $70 for risk security, in which case he increases his utility"0 if he
76. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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can find an insurance company to assume the risk for $60 (at an ex-
pected cost to the company of $50).
Applying the foregoing analysis to the contract-to-repair cases in-
dicates that if the courts had ruled forthrightly, as they did in the
contract-to-build cases,17 that either the builder or the owner bore the
risk of fire, then future parties would have been better off. If the
courts had assigned the risk to building contractors, assuming momen-
tarily that they are better able to insure, either by self-insuring or by
buying a single insurance contract to cover all their repair jobs, then
their bids would reflect the expected cost of the risk of fire. If the
courts had assigned the cost of the risk of fire to owners, then, still as-
suming that contractors are better able to insure, contractors could gain
a competitive advantage over their competitors by offering to assume
the risk of fire at a cost lower than that at which the owner could pur-
chase insurance on his own. In the long run contractors and owners
would customarily allocate the risk of fire to the contractors during their
negotiations, raising the prices of repair jobs, but at an increment less
than the cost to the owners of procuring insurance elsewhere. No mat-
ter which way the law initially assigned risk security, the subsequent
bargaining and exchange would bring the parties to the most efficient
rate of construction because bargaining and exchange has the effect
of producing an efficient distribution of resources.78
Since the vague definition of contract interests which results when
the courts apply the doctrine of impossibility means less wealth for
future parties, one might naturally inquire where the wealth is lost. A
typical first guess might be that the loss is in the form of litigation ex-
penses. If this were the upshot of the analysis so far, it would be fair
to ask why one should bother with this analysis. The loss of wealth,
however, is more subtle than that. The reason that the parties are not
immediately aware of the loss is that they lost it a century ago. Imag-
ine the legislature passing a statute to the effect that the government
would periodically flip a coin five times, and if the coin came up heads
on each flip, a landowner would lose his land. The flip of the coin
would not cost the landowner anything (that is, his litigation costs
would be zero), but the landowner's property would suddenly drop in
value because formerly well defined property interests would become
vague property interests subject to forfeiture unexpectedly. Contract
interests subject to unforeseeable forfeiture through the operation of
the doctrine of impossibility are likewise made less valuable. The dif-
ference is that in the land ownership example landowners now enjoy
well defined property interests and would notice the loss; in the con-
77. See cases cited note 19 supra.
78. Hayek, Socialist Calculation: The Competitive Solution, 7 ECoNOMICA 125
(1940).
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tract example the parties to the contract do not enjoy well defined con-
tract interests and do not realize that their contract interests would be
worth more if they were more precisely defined. 79
The point to be drawn so far is that definite risk assignment is
more economically efficient than indefinite risk assignment. The gen-
eralization that a risk assignment to either party will produce an equally
efficient result assumes that the costs of bargaining and exchange are
relatively low. When those costs are relatively high, that generalization
is no longer accurate, as will be discussed below.
80
The Analysis Extended to Other Cases: The Suez Cases
The building contract cases ably demonstrate what happens when
courts apply the doctrine of impossibility. The consequences of the
doctrine extend beyond the building cases to contracts generally, as is
shown by reexamining the extensively discussed group of cases which
arose after war closed the Suez Canal in 1956,81 forcing ships to sail
around the Cape of Good Hope and provoking litigation lasting over
ten years. The cases involved two types of contracts: charter party
contracts,82 whereby a shipowner chartered his ship to another, and
contracts for sale, c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight),83 whereby a
foreign seller agreed to ship and insure goods, the contract price pre-
sumably reflecting these costs. These cases highlight the complexity
of the issues involved in the doctrine of impossibility. Arbitrators and
courts considered the question whether the doctrine of impossibility
applied to the Suez closing twenty different times before they finally
determined that the doctrine did not apply to either the contracts for
sale, c.i.f., or the charter party contracts.8 4 If the courts had ruled orig-
79. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 87-94 infra.
81. The legal rationales of the holdings are discussed at length by two commenta-
tors. See Birmingham, supra note 41; Schlegel, supra note 41.
82. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960); Ocean Tramp
Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht, [1963] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 155 (Q.B.), rev'd, [1964]
2 Q.B. 226 (C.A. 1963); Socit6 Franco Tunisienne D'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A.,
[1961] 2 Q.B. 278 (1960).
83. Albert D. Gaon & Co. v. Soci~t6 Interprofessionelle des Oleagineux Fluides
Alimentaires, [1960] 2 Q.B. 334 (1959), afl'd, [1960] 2 Q.B. 348 (C.A.); Tsakiroglou
& Co. v. Noblee Thorl, G.m.b.H., [1960] 2 Q.B. 318 (1958), aJfd, [1960] 2 Q.B. 348
(C.A.), alf'd, [1962] A.C. 93 (1961); Carapanayoti & Co. v. E.T. Green, Ltd., [1959]
1 Q.B. 131 (1958).
84. Of the English cases, the history of the charter party contract cases is as fol-
lows: The first to come up was Franco Tunisienne D'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A.,
[1961] 2 Q.B. 278 (1960), in which a shipowner chartered his ship to the defendant,
who tendered to the shipowner a load of iron ore a week after the closing. The ship-
owner later claimed the reasonable value of the voyage from India to Italy via the Cape
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inally85 that one party or the other would bear all the risks of increased
costs due to war, then the parties in the Suez cases would not have
been subject to the uncertainty which resulted from the closing of the
canal.8 6
of Good Hope, asserting that the closing frustrated the original contract. The arbitrator
ruled in favor of the charterer, but the court discharged the shipowner and ruled that
the original contract was frustrated. In 1963 the V/O Sovfracht case reached the court
of appeals; the court, through Lord Denning, M.R., reversed the trial court and ruled
that the charter contract between the parties was not frustrated just because the char-
terer had to sail the ship to India via the Cape. Ocean Tramp Corp. v. VO Sovfracht,
(1964] 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A. 1963), rev'g [1963] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 155 (Q.B.). Sidermar
was overruled.
The history of the c.i.f. contract cases is even more involved. The first was Cara-
panayoti & Co. v. E.T. Green, Ltd., [1959] 1 Q.B. 131 (1958). The arbitration umpire
and the board of appeal held that the seller of Sudanese semi-decorticated cottonseed
cake was not excused because of the high cost of shipping around the Cape, but the trial
court reversed, ruling that the contract was frustrated. In the same year and in the fol-
lowing one similar cases reached the courts. In the Tsakiroglou case, decided in Decem-
ber of 1958, the court held that the closing did not frustrate a c.i.f. contract for the
sale of Sudanese groundnuts. Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thorl, G.m.b.H., [1960] 2
Q.B. 318 (1958). In so doing the court affirmed the arbitration umpire and board of
appeal, distinguishing Carapanayoti. Id. at 328. In June, 1959, the court decided an-
other Sudanese groundnut c.i.f. contract case, Gaon, and again affirmed arbitration and
board of appeal decisions that frustration did not apply. Albert D. Gaon & Co. v. So-
ci~t6 Interprofessionelle des Oleagineux Fluides Alimentaires, [1960] 2 Q.B. 334 (1959).
The court in Gaon, however, disapproved of Carapanayoti. Id. at 347. Tsakiroglou
and Gaon were appealed together; on appeal, the judgments were affirmed and Carapan-
ayoti overruled. [1960] 2 Q.B. 348 (C.A.). Tsakiroglou was appealed to the House of
Lords, where the judgment was affirmed. [1962] A.C. 93 (1961).
85. E.g., Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921); Lloyd v. Mur-
phy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
86. Two of the c.i.f. cases (see note 83 supra) involved contracts for the sale of
Sudanese groundnuts. If, before the contracts in question were agreed upon, the courts
bad assigned the risk of war to seller, then the overseas prices of groundnuts would have
reflected the expected cost of the risk of war. If the court had assigned the risk to the
European buyers, the retail price would have reflected the cost to the buyers of procuring
war insurance. Even though the competing sellers would sell at a price not reflecting
the cost of the war risk, retail prices charged in Europe would reflect that cost and would
approximate the price which would have resulted if the risk had been assigned to over-
seas sellers. If the sellers could self-insure or procure outside insurance at a lower cost
than could buyers, then sellers could gain a competitive advantage over other sellers by
offering to assume the risk of war at a lower cost than the buyer would have to pay
for insurance he obtained on his own. In the long run, sellers and buyers would cus-
tomarily allocate the risk of war to sellers during their negotiations, raising the whole-
sale price, but at an increment less than the cost to the buyers of procuring insurance
elsewhere. In either case, the retail price and the amount sold at retail would be approx-
imately the same, as would the sellers' and buyers' profits.
The Sudanese seller's profits would be affected by the cost of the war risk but un-
affected by the way it was assigned. If it were assigned to the Sudanese seller, he would
charge higher prices, but his costs would be commensurably higher; if it were assigned
to the European buyer, the seller's costs would be lower, but so would the market price
of nuts. In either case his profits would be nearly the same.
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The Problem of Transaction Costs
The fact that an assignment of the risk of loss either way produces
an equally efficient87 result does not mean that a court in a case of first
impression has no factors to consider when deciding to whom to assign
the risk. The building and shipping contract examples88 involved situ-
ations where the transaction costs were low compared to the amounts
involved in performance of the contracts. Examples of transaction
costs include the cost of hiring attorneys to negotiate the contracts and
the cost of acquiring information as to which builders, sellers, or in-
surers are willing to deal. When transaction costs are relatively high,
the bargaining and exchange of risk security may not take place.
Suppose that the law assigns the war risk to foreign sellers and
the corresponding risk security to buyers. If buyer A could procure
war insurance for $100 and seller B could procure it for $200, then
a more efficient distribution of risk security would result if B persuaded
A to sell him the risk security for any amount less than $200. A, of
course, would be unwilling to sell it for anything less than $100, and
so they would arrive at a price between $100 and $200. Thus the
process of bargaining and exchange produces an efficient distribution
of the resource of risk security.89
Bargaining and exchange, however, is not a cost-free process.90
For every exchange which improves the parties' positions, there is a
corresponding transaction cost which comes out of someone's pocket.
Typically, one or both of the parties bears the cost. If the cost to either
party exceeds the gain he expects to realize from the exchange, that
party will not consider making the exchange, as it would leave him
worse off. Thus any policy of the law which reduces transaction costs
also promotes efficiency and improves the welfare of society.9  One
way to minimize transaction costs is for the law to assign the property
right in question to the party who would have purchased it if the right
had been assigned to the other party and if the transaction costs were
zero." Applying this principle to the impossibility cases has this re-
By the same sort of analysis, the European buyer's profits would be affected by the
cost of the war risk but unaffected by the way it is assigned. His costs would increase
if the risk of war increases, either in the form of higher wholesale prices, if the risk
were assigned to sellers, or in the form of higher insurance costs, if the risk were as-
signed to buyers. In either case his profits, like the seller's, would be nearly the same
because the risk assignment would not affect consumer demand.
87. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 62-78 & 81-86 supra.
89. Hayek, Socialist Calculation: The Competitive Solution, 7 ECONOMICA 125
(1940).
90. For example, to buy stock on a national exchange one must pay a commission
to a broker.
91. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 18.
92. Id.
1272 [Vol. 26
suit: Whenever a court faces a case in which either party invokes the
doctrine of impossibility, the court should consider why the parties
failed to allocate the risk themselves. If high transaction costs appar-
ently make negotiation overly expensive with regard to the particular
risk, then the court should consider whether either party would logically
have purchased risk security from the other had the negotiation costs
been sufficiently low to make the exchange mutually profitable.
93
If the court can determine that a particular party would have pur-
claased risk security from the other under these conditions, then the
court should assign risk security to that party,94 thereby maximizing ef-
ficiency and social welfare. In the example just posed, if high transac-
tion costs prevented the foreign seller, B, from buying risk security
from A, the buyer, then a court deciding a case between A and B,
where war disrupted their contract, could maximize the efficiency of
future transactions by assigning security from the risk of war once and
for all to sellers such as B, since they would purchase risk security from
buyers if the law initially assigned risk security to buyers and if trans-
action costs were zero.
It is one thing to say that the court should assign risk security to
the party who would have acquired it had transaction costs been zero
and another thing to tell the court how to determine who would have
acquired risk security under these circumstances. In the previous ex-
ample, the crucial factor was that A could procure war insurance
cheaper than B could. Determining who may better insure in turn de-
pends on several factors: Who has control of the risk? Who has the
special knowledge required to assess the risk? Who is in a position
to self-insure? Who is in a position to procure insurance at a lower
cost? In complex exchanges there may be a multitude of factors to
consider, but a court aware of the nature of the problem is more likely
to arrive at the optimum assignment of risk security than one which
assigns risk security inconsistently or fails to assign it clearly, as happens
when a court allows a plea of impossibility.
An Alternative to Judicial Assignment-Should the
Legislature Decide?
In view of the complexity of the issues involved in determining
which assignment of risk security will minimize transaction costs, one
might argue that the legislatures are better equipped to make the deter-
mination than are the courts.95 Richard Posner, a prominent writer in
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Besides the question of competency -to decide, there is the additional issue
posed by the fact that the authority of a judicial risk assignment rests upon the authority
of stare decisis. To the extent that earlier cases can be distinguished, a judicial assign-
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the field of law and economics, 9  suggests that judges tend to make
economically wiser decisions than do legislators, who presumably are
subject to the malign influences of backers and lobbyists. Since one
can imagine malign influences on judges as well, the proposition is de-
batable.9 7  A comparison of the judicial solution to the impossibility
cases with the legislative experience with the same problems shows that
legislatures have made wiser risk assignments than have the judges who
retain the doctrine of impossibility as part of the common law.
The first legislative attempt to assign the risk of loss in sales con-
tracts was not successful. Section 22 of the Uniform Sales Act pro-
vided that the party who had the "property" in the item also had the
risk of its loss. Though this section had the blessing of simplicity, it
also created the inefficiency of uncertainty. Contracting parties fre-
quently dealt with each other without considering when either party
had the property in the thing sold,98 with the result that if the contract
was silent on the matter, the court's allocation of the losses depended
on the difficult task of discovering the parties' intentions when the par-
ties in fact had expressed no intentions.
The difficulty was eliminated in section 2-509 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (Risk of Loss in the Absence of Breach), which pro-
vides explicit, though detailed, assignments of the risk of loss. When
the contract requires the seller to ship the goods, the risk of loss passes
to the buyer when the goods are tendered to the carrier unless the con-
tract requires the seller to deliver them to a particular destination. In
the latter case the risk passes when the goods are so tendered as to
enable the buyer to take possession.99 When shipment is not re-
quired, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when he receives the
goods.'
Section 2-509 meets all the requirements of an economically
sound assignment of risks by the law. First, the risk of loss is assigned
clearly: the parties' contract interests are well defined. Second, the
section attempts to minimize transaction costs by assigning the risk to
the party who is better able and more likely to insure: comment 3 states
that the theory of section 2-509 is that a merchant who is to deliver
the goods at his own plant "continues meanwhile to control the goods
and can be expected to insure his interest in them."'' Third, the sec-
ment may not be as secure as a legislative assignment. The counter argument, of course,
is that legislative assignments are insecure to the extent that they may be repealed.
96. POSNER, supra note 59, at 328.
97. See also Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REv. 483 (1974).
98. E.g., Radloff v. Bragmus, 214 Minn. 130, 7 N.W.2d 491 (1943).
99. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-509(1).
100. See id. § 2-509(3). This section applies only to merchants. See text accom-
panying note 103 infra.
101. Id. § 2-509, comment 3 (emphasis added).
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tion allows the parties to reassign the risk, which allows readjustment
in those cases in which the code happens to assign the risk to the party
less able to insure.1"' The drafters, however, appear to have at-
tempted to minimize the need for readjustment. For instance, when
the seller is not a merchant, the code provides a special exception,
transferring the risk from the seller to the buyer when the seller tenders
delivery, rather than when the buyer receives the goods.0 3
The legislative experience with risk assignment has not been as
successful as section 2-509 might otherwise indicate. With respect to
risks other than the risk of loss,' 0 the Uniform Commercial Code un-
fortunately returns to the traditional approach, enacting a doctrine of
commercial impracticability in section 2-615. Although the name
change from impossibility to commercial impracticability more accu-
rately describes the doctrine of impossibility,'05 section 2-615 still pro-
duces the inefficiencies inherent in the common law doctrine of impos-
sibility.
Conclusion
In situations in which traditional legal analysis has not produced
satisfactory results, practitioners have a powerful tool, in the form of
economic concepts and theories, with which to provide courts with new
insights into old problems. Approaching the impossibility cases from
both the legal and the economic points of view shows the futility in
trying to find solutions by examining the short run effects of different
loss allocation schemes. Examining the long-run effects of the doctrine
of impossibility shows that it produces vaguely defined contract inter-
ests. An economic analysis of the long-run effects of these schemes
shows that if the courts or the legislatures assign the risks of contract
disruption to one party or the other, the welfare of society will be
greater than if the law continues to leave contract interests subject to
the doctrine of impossibility. When transaction costs are zero, it does
not matter to whom the law assigns the risk and the corresponding risk
security, as long as the law assigns the risk to someone.
In order to avoid transaction costs, which produce inefficiencies,
the courts or legislatures should attempt to allocate the risk in the man-
ner the parties would eventually have allocated it had transaction costs
102. Id. § 2-509(4).
103. Id. § 2-509(3).
104. For instance, in these uncertain times the courts may anticipate a plea of
"commercial impracticability" on the grounds that inflation made a long-term contract
extremely burdensome.
105. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
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not hindered a potential exchange. In a competitive market the parties
would have allocated the risk to the party able to insure against it at
a lower cost.
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